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ABSTRACT 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has become highly 
reliant on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology in 
mission-critical unclassified systems to reduce both the 
cost time to acquire a system, and standardize support for 
deployed systems.  It is challenging for the DoD to 
determine whether and how much to trust in COTS components, 
given uncertainty and incomplete information about the 
developers and suppliers of COTS components as well as the 
capabilities provided by COTS components. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the current 
landscape of DoD information assurance (IA) as it pertains 
to COTS components, show how Jøsang's trust model can be 
used to calculate trust based on opinions provided by 
multiple government and non-government services, and explore 
the need for cross-domain sharing of information to support 
populating, maintaining, and using the trust models. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis identifies challenges in the use of 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components, a type of non-
developmental items (NDI), in mission-critical but 
unclassified systems.  The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
increasingly turns to acquiring COTS components in order to 
reduce both the cost and time to acquire a system, and to 
standardize support for deployed systems. 
On June 29, 1994, then Secretary of Defense William 
Perry issued a memorandum prohibiting the use of legacy 
military defense standards without a waiver and encouraged 
the use of industry standards.  Weapon systems were required 
to use "performance specifications" that described the 
desired features of the weapon system instead of citing 
military standards [1].  This memo removed the requirement 
of military standards and specifications and has lead to 
DoD's present-day reliance on COTS components. 
The capabilities provided by COTS components do not 
always match up with the requirements of DoD.  Usually, 
provision of built-in security features for such mass-
marketed components is not the highest priority of the 
developer.  Instead the developer's focus is on time-to-
market concerns and the primary functionality of the system 
[2].  The reliability of such components and the security of 
such systems are assigned a low priority relative to the 
functionality of the system. 
The typical development cycle for software and 
electronic components is now less than one year, making it 
difficult for DoD entities to perform extensive independent 
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verification and validation (IV&V), as well as Information 
Assurance (IA) certification and accreditation (C&A), on the 
systems containing COTS components. 
COTS components tend to have a short life cycle, 
contributing to the challenge for the DoD in maintaining 
legacy systems due to the unavailability of components.  
"Component churn," that is the movement of components into 
or out of service, makes IV&V and IA C&A even more 
challenging. 
A trustworthy system is one that provides the 
appropriate levels of correctness and robustness in 
accomplishing its mission [3].  Trust in this context is 
especially important in critical yet unclassified systems 
which affect lives and national assets, yet the systems have 
not been vetted to the same extent as systems that process 
classified data. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the current 
landscape of DoD IA as it pertains to COTS components, show 
how Jøsang's trust model can be used to calculate trust 
based on opinions provided by multiple government and non-
government services, and explore the need for cross-domain 
sharing of information to support populating, maintaining, 
and using the trust models. 
A. MOTIVATIONS FOR THIS THESIS 
Consider the reverse engineering efforts undertaken by 
large communities of people to exploit commercially 
available hardware such as video game consoles, cell phones, 
and Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers, in order to 
remove installed security features and add functionality not 
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included in the original systems.  Many of these groups 
receive little or no monetary compensation for their efforts 
and are only motivated by the notoriety they receive from 
their exploits.  Such groups with little to no sponsorship 
have successfully thwarted security systems specifically 
designed to prevent such actions. 
 
Figure 1.   Photograph of Xbox internals. 
For example, in November of 2001, Microsoft released 
the Xbox video game console based on common personal 
computer (PC) hardware.  The Xbox is essentially a PC with 
an Intel Mobile Celeron processor, hard drive, nVidia 
GeForce video card, random access memory (RAM), Ethernet 
port, and Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports cleverly 
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disguised as game controller ports [4]. The resemblance of 
the Xbox to a common PC.  On the left is the hard disk drive 
and on the right is the DVD drive.  It is thought that 
Microsoft chose common off-the-shelf components to reduce 
cost, development time, and time-to-market.  Because of the 
use of such common components, the aforementioned groups 
were able to relatively quickly exploit the system since the 
groups were quite familiar with how PCs and their peripheral 
devices operated.  Andrew Huang, at that time a doctoral 
student at MIT, is credited with extracting the Xbox basic 
input/output system (BIOS) and publishing it on his website.  
Eventually he was able to intercept the RC4 encryption key 
used to encrypt the bootloader and BIOS by monitoring 
traffic on the HyperTransport bus.  The bootloader and BIOS 
were then modified by various groups to allow the Xbox to 
boot executables without the correct RSA signature or boot 
from an unapproved media (e.g., boot from the Xbox hard 
drive vice the DVD drive).  The altered BIOS and bootloader 
prompted the widespread piracy of Xbox games.  Additionally, 
the leaking of Microsoft's official Software Development Kit 
(SDK) allowed the development of various "homebrew" 
applications and the porting of an assortment of 
applications.  It is possible to install the Linux operating 
system (OS) on the Xbox hard drive and use the USB 




Figure 2.   Photograph used to identify Xbox 360 DVD drives.  
The successor to the Xbox, the Xbox 360, was released 
in November of 2005.  Microsoft hardened the internal OS of 
the newer system, but still employed common, commercially 
available, DVD readers in its product.  Two of the many 
types of DVD drives utilized are illustrated in Figure 2.  
Eventually, most Xbox 360 DVD drives' firmware were reverse 
engineered and altered to report all media inserted into the 
drives as authenticated.  Similar reverse engineering 
efforts have allowed the execution of unauthenticated code 
on products such as Sony's Play Station Portable, Apple's 
Iphone, and various GPS receivers running the Windows CE OS. 
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The implications of such actions are clear.  Unfunded 
groups with limited resources are able to remove security 
features of commercial products designed to deter such 
actions.  A well-funded adversary, such as state-sponsored 
information warriors or non-state actors such as members of 
organized crime syndicates or terrorist organizations, may 
be able to exploit DoD's reliance on COTS in much the same 
way or perhaps by interfering with the design, development, 
and implementation of COTS components.  DoD must examine the 
issues surrounding its dependence on COTS and if appropriate 
implement more stringent acquisition policies. 
It is not enough to vet just the components of systems.  
It is also necessary to scrutinize the developers or 
suppliers of the components.  The behavior of a system 
containing two or more components must be understood too. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. INFORMATION ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMERICIAL OFF 
THE SHELF TECHNOLOGY 
Information Assurance (IA) is defined as:  “Measures 
that protect and defend information systems by ensuring 
their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation…” by the Committee on 
National Security Systems [6].  IA provides a measure of 
confidence that a particular software or hardware system 
will perform as designed and has not been tampered with or 
compromised.  In order to have confidence in the system, we 
must first have confidence in all of the components of that 
system. 
The Computer Security Act of 1987 clarified the 
definition of “national security-related information,” and 
assigned responsibility of all federal unclassified 
information systems (including DoD systems) to the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).   
However, all “national security-related information” 
systems are governed by the National Security Agency (NSA).  
Therefore, all non-“national security-related information” 
COTS IT systems must meet NIST’s IA requirements. 
B. IA VULNERABILITIES THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE LIFE CYCLE 
Vulnerabilities capable of negatively affecting IA can 
be introduced anywhere in the product life cycle.  Potential 
vulnerabilities in the Systems Development Life Cycle 
(SDLC), vulnerabilities during implementation, 
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vulnerabilities during production and manufacturing, and 
vulnerabilities during distribution will be discussed in 
this chapter. 
Infiltrating a component manufacturer's development 
system and allowing unsuspecting users to install components 
for malactors is becoming more efficient for the malactors 
than attacking each installation individually.  In many 
cases, infiltrating the development cycle presents the 
weakest-link in the component life cycle [7]. 
1. Systems Development Life Cycle 
The SDLC refers to the phases of development of a 
system.  There are many well-known SDLC models, the most 





a. Standard SDLCs 
In this context, the term "standard" will refer to 
the un-modified or academic definition of each of the SDLCs.  
Many SDLCs have been modified to fit a particular use, or to 
fit a specific timeline. 
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b. The Waterfall Model 
 
Figure 3.   Un-modified "Waterfall" model.  Work proceeds from 
the top phase and cascades downward. 
As illustrated in the above figure, the waterfall 
flows from one phase of the process to another.  Each phase is 
completed sequentially, and one phase is not started until the 
previous one is both complete and verified.  The phases 
include: 
• Requirements:  The systems specifications are 
established to include constraints and goals, 
usually by analyzing the needs of the users. 
• System design:  Divides the requirements into 
either hardware or software as appropriate and 
establishes an overall system architecture.  
Determines a framework by which requirements 
can be implemented.  Includes user interface, 
data structures, etc. 
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• Implementation:  Each component of the 
hardware or software is realized and tested 
to ensure it meets the specification. 
• Integration or installation:  Individual 
components are integrated or installed.  
Testing is performed on the entire system to 
ensure software requirements have been met. 
• Operation and maintenance:  Usually the 
longest and most expensive phase.  The system 
is put into use.  Maintenance is required for 
undiscovered deficiencies [8]. 
The "Waterfall" model is easy to use and provides 
a rigid structure to the developmental process.  Milestones 
are easy to discern and track.  However, it can be argued 
that it is difficult if not impossible to implement this 
model because of the difficulty in completely finishing one 
phase before moving on to the next.  Additionally if the 
requirements and system design phases were not correctly 
completed, it may be impossible to continue to implement the 
system.  Following the Waterfall model makes it difficult to 
modify security or IA requirements in later phases.  Even 
with these possible flaws, this model (and variations of it) 
is often used for acquisition of systems in which quality is 
more important than cost or schedule. 
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c. V-shaped Model 
 
Figure 4.   V-Shaped model. 
The V-Shaped model is a variant of the Waterfall 
model that puts emphasis on verification and validation 
(V&V) of the system.  The model ties each phase of 
development to a phase of testing 
The V-Shaped model has the same strengths and 
weakness as with the Waterfall but is more suited to systems 
that require V&V of the system early and often throughout 
development.  Additionally, like the Waterfall method, it 
does not easily allow for changing requirements or 
concurrent events. 
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d. Spiral Development 
 
Figure 5.   Spiral Model (Boehm 1988). 
 
The Spiral model was proposed by Barry Boehm [9].  
It is an iterative process where the same four steps are 
carried out for each phase of the previously discussed 
models.  For example, the innermost loop might represent 
requirements gathering and the next loop system design, etc.  
What truly distinguishes the Spiral model from other models 
is that the model calls for analyzing risk in every phase of 
development. 
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The Spiral model provides an indication of 
insurmountable risks early in the process because high-risk 
functions are often developed first.  The model promotes the 
management of recognized risks prior to attempting 
traditional phased software development.  The Spiral model 
is appropriate when costs and risk evaluation are important 
and when a prototype is needed.  The Spiral model may be 
unsuitable for smaller or lower risk projects. 
e. Compressed SDLCs 
Pressure to be first to market and retain what is 
known as mind share compresses the development 
cycle so much that software engineering methods 
are often thrown out the window…often leaving 
rigorous testing to the users [10]. 
In general, SDLC models are compressed by 
overlapping stages, working various stages of the model in 
parallel, or both.  Compressing the development cycle can 
lead to decreased time for testing.  Decreased time for 
testing can lead to an increase in the number and severity 





Table 1.  Core principles of the Agile Manifesto (From Department 
of Homeland Defense in Security in the Software Lifecycle). 
The Agile model operates on the belief that it is 
impossible to design a system without first providing a 
rudimentary version of the system to users and then 
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observing the results.  "It may be only after a system is 
delivered and users gain experience with it that the real 
requirements become clear” [11].  Most Agile-based methods 
adhere to the Agile Manifesto whose principles and 
applicability to security are listed by the Department of 
Homeland Defense in Security in the Software Lifecycle shown 
in Table 1.   
 
Table 2.  Major Agile Methods (From Department of Homeland 
Defense in Security in the Software Lifecycle). 
Not every SDLC shown above explicitly takes into 
account security in its procedures.  While each of the above 
SDLCs can produce secure components, better results are 
achieved when security is considered at the beginning and 
throughout the process.  Retrofitting security onto the 
product or component (if it can be done at all) after it has 
been released, does not lead to a desired security state. 
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2. Development and Implementation Strategies 
Development strategies are ways of implementing a 
product or service and include incremental development and 
evolutionary development. 
a. Incremental Development 
Incremental development involves pre-planned 
segmented development of the product or components in 
increments.  This strategy is often selected to accommodate 
funding limitations, handle contractor specialties, simplify 
deployment plans, improve development sequence, and deal 
with integration issues [12]. 
In the incremental model, customers define an 
outline of the services to be provided by the system.  Each 
of the services is then prioritized and a number of delivery 
increments is defined [13].  This allows for the 
construction of a partial implementation of a total system.  
As each increment is added to the total system, 
functionality is increased.  Pieces of the total system are 
provided earlier so that customers can immediately benefit 
from the new system.  This model requires well-defined 
module interfaces (e.g., APIs in a software system) since 
some parts of the system will be delivered much earlier than 
others.  The incremental approach relies on a divide-and-
conquer strategy for development. 
b. Evolutionary Development 
Evolutionary Development involves successive 
improvements of products or components based on experience 
with prior versions.  This strategy is often selected to 
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accommodate uncertain requirements, changing problem 
environments, and challenging technology objectives [14]. 
The evolutionary development strategy combines the 
requirements, design, and testing phases of system 
development to quickly produce a prototype for user testing 
from a set of vague user needs.  The prototype is then 
evaluated by the end users and feedback is submitted.  
Developers take the feedback and improve on the original 
prototype.  This model is perceived as not scaling well and 
is thought to produce un-organized, un-maintainable code 
that is difficult to reuse. 
Security concerns must be taken into account when 
implementing either incremental or evolutionary 
developmental strategies.  Special consideration should be 
given to the implementation of the evolutionary development 
strategy because it is likely components utilizing this 
strategy are first-generation and lessons learned from 
previous generation component installations are not 
available.  When implementing incremental development 
strategies, the "lessons learned" and any other information 
from previous use or installation should be utilized in 
order to avoid making the same mistake. 
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Figure 6.   Global Semiconductor Sales (data from:  
Semiconductor Industry Association). 
In the early days of the semiconductor industry, DoD 
and NASA represented a large percentage of the overall sales 
of all semiconductors and therefore could easily drive the 
direction of product development and dictate manufacturing 
requirements.  In today’s global economy, DoD and NASA now 
represent less than one percent of the worlds semiconductor 
market [15].  "While the military provided the original test 
bed for many computers and microelectronics, defense needs 
are not the driver for the newest technologies in these 
fields in most cases” [16]. 
Market forces have led to the migration of the 
semiconductor industry from industrialized nations such as 
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the United States, Japan, and Europe to countries in Asia 
where the cost of labor, land, and material are 
significantly lower. 
This migration has led to difficulties of trust and IA 
with respect to these semiconductor components.  As of May 
2008, 49% of semiconductor manufacturing occurs in the Asia 
Pacific region and only 16% occurs within North and South 
America. 
During the 18th century, British forests became 
depleted of Baltic fir, prized for its use in wooden ships 
of war.  In order to fulfill the demand for quality timber, 
the British turned to its American colonies which had a 
nearly infinite supply of Live oak that was well suited for 
ship construction and perhaps better suited than the highly 
coveted Baltic fir.  The American colonies began exporting 
large quantities of oak across the Atlantic for use by 
British ship builders.  Soon, the British realized it would 
be more cost efficient to send ship builders across the 
Atlantic to the Americas and teach the soon to be Americans 
how to build ships.  Eventually, the colonists became 
proficient at building ships, and were able to improve upon 
the British methods.  This outsourcing eventually allowed 
the colonies to hoard the best timber for themselves in 
order to build ships such as the USS CONSITITUTION that were 
able to outrun many ships of the line at the time and proved 
invaluable during the American Revolution [17].  This 
anecdote can be applied to today's reliance on foreign 
manufacturing of COTS components.  We have exported COTS 
component manufacturing technology overseas in an effort to 
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be more cost efficient without taking into account the 
possible consequences of our actions. 
4. Distribution Vulnerabilities 
The networked nature of the modern world has produced 
unique distribution vulnerabilities with respect to both 
hardware and software. 
a. Distribution Vulnerabilities and Software 
In the past, software was distributed either by a 
physical medium or pre-installed on new computer systems.  
This method of distribution offered some assurance since it 
is presumed difficult to infiltrate such a closed 
distribution chain.  However, with the popularity of the 
Internet, online distribution is more prevalent then ever.  
Even when software is distributed by physical means, it is 
almost always updated via the Internet.  This dependence on 
a publicly accessible network to update software has 
encouraged malactors to infiltrate the software distribution 
supply. 
On August 22, 2008, Red Hat released a statement 
indicating that an intruder into their network was able to 
get a small number of OpenSSH packages relating to its Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux versions 4 and 5 signed by Red Hat's 
private Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) key [18]. 
If a malactor had been able to get their altered 
OpenSSH signed software into one of Red Hat's many official 




install their software on any workstation or server using 
these mirrors potentially allowing them root access to 
thousands of machines. 
b. Distribution Vulnerabilities and Hardware 
 
Figure 7.   Counterfeit and genuine Cisco card (from:  
http://www.andovercg.com/services/cisco-counterfeit-
wic-1dsu-t1.shtml). 
On January 4, 2008, Michael and Robert Edman were 
charged with trafficking in counterfeit Cisco hardware they 
had purchased from an individual in China.  The counterfeit 
hardware was then sold through middlemen, and shipped to the 
United States Marine Corps, Air Force, Federal Aviation 
Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and several 
defense contractors, universities and financial institutions 
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[19].  While this particular incident of counterfeiting has 
not been shown to be anything other than financially 
motivated, the implications are clear.  With the current 
global supply chain, it is difficult to discern exactly 
where components are manufactured and under what conditions.  
Additionally, intentionally compromised devices, whether for 
financial gain or for espionage, constitute a threat to 
national security. 
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III. JØSANG'S MODEL 
In the previous chapter, we provided examples of how 
vulnerabilities throughout the entire component life cycle 
were exploited.  So, how does one know what components to 
trust in mission-critical yet unclassified systems?  One 
method is to purchase only accredited components from 
trusted manufacturers.  But, how do we assign trust to these 
manufacturers?  Can opinions on trust be calculated? 
In his thesis "Trust and its Ramifications for the DoD 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)," Leonard Gaines analyzed 
five different trust models with respect to their 
applicability to modeling the use of PKI within DoD.  After 
reviewing each of the models, he chose to apply Audun 
Jøsang's model because he felt it was the most comprehensive 
and had the greatest potential to be practically implemented 
[20].  We feel that based on Gaines' research, Jøsang's 
model will provide the best trust model for calculating 
trust with respect to COTS component manufacturers. 
Audun Jøsang presented a model for making trust-based 
decisions in his paper "Trust-based decision making for 
electronic transactions" in 1999, in which he focused on 
using his technique to show how trust in remote agents can 
be calculated based on trust recommendations from many 
different sources embedded within public key certificates 
used in public key cryptography. 
In this thesis, we demonstrate the applicability of his 
method of calculating trust to manufacturers of COTS 
components.  We assume the various government communities  
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will provide trust recommendations expressed mathematically 
such as in Jøsang's method explained below and then provide 
an example. 
His model can be similarly applied to other areas of 
the product life cycle, such as the SDLC or applied to 
software and hardware distribution chain. 
A. JØSANG'S MODEL DEFINED 
Jøsang expresses "opinions" mathematically as: 
 
 1, , , [0,1]b d u b d u+ + = ∈  (1.1) 
 
where b, d, and u represent belief, disbelief, and 
uncertainty, respectively.  Uncertainty is used when there 
is no evidence to support either belief or disbelief.  An 
example demonstrating the uncertainty component can be found 
in Daniel Ellsberg, "Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms" 
reproduced below: 
Let us suppose that you confront two urns 
containing red and black balls, from one of which 
a ball will be drawn at random. To 'bet on Red' 
will mean that you choose to draw from Urn I; and 
that you will receive a prize a (say $100) if you 
draw a red ball and a smaller amount b (say $0) 
if you draw a black. You have the following 
information: Urn I contains 100 red and black 
balls, but in ratio entirely unknown to you; 
there may be from 0 to 100 red balls. In Urn II, 
you confirm that there are exactly 50 red and 50 
black balls. 
The probability of drawing a red ball from Urn II is 
0.5, since there is an equal number of red balls and black 
balls in the urn.  However, if one was forced to make a bet 
 25
on the outcome of drawing a red ball from Urn 1, where one 
does not know the color distribution of the balls, most 
people will still agree that the probability of drawing a 
red ball is 0.5, since there are only two different colors 
in the urn.  The value 0.5 is intuitively selected because 
there are only two possible colors { , }red blackθ =  and that 
1|{ }| x | |
2
red θ=  so the uncertain probability of drawing a red 
would have been 0.5.  If there were five different colors 
{ , , , , }red black blue yellow greenθ =  then 1|{ }| x | |
5
red θ=  and the uncertain 
probability of drawing a red would have been 0.2.  This 
concept of calculating the uncertain probability given only 
the number of states (number of distinct colors in this 
case) is known as relative atomicity, denoted by a.   
This example illustrates a unique phenomenon where in 
one case where the distribution is known, and in the other 
the distribution is unknown, yet they both appear to have 
the same probability of being selected, 0.5. 
In Jøsang's model, ( , , , )w b d u a=  is an ordered quadruple 
whose components correspond to belief, disbelief, 
uncertainty, and relative atomicity, respectively.  w is 
defined to be an opinion.  An opinion has an ownership which 
will be designated by a subscript.  For example, Ayw  denotes 
an opinion on proposition y, held by agent A. 
We will use Jøsang quadruples in Chapter IV to 
manipulate opinions of COTS component manufacturers. 
The probability expectation of w, denoted by E(w) is 
defined by Jøsang to be: 
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 ( )E w b au= +  (1.2) 
 
The probability expectation consists of belief, 
uncertainty, and relative atomicity. 
B. SUBJECTIVE LOGIC 
Jøsang defines an algebra-based method for manipulating 
opinions on binary propositions called subjective logic.  
Subjective logic contains the following operators:  
conjunction, disjunction, negation, recommendation, and 
consensus.  The first three operators are very similar to 
those of standard Boolean algebra.  However, the 
recommendation and consensus operators are what set 
subjective logic apart from Boolean algebra and standard 
logic. 
1. Conjunction Operator 
Given that x and y represent two distinct propositions 
denoted as ( , , , )x x x x xw b d u a=  and ( , , , )y y y y yw b d u a=  respectively, 
then the belief that both x and y are true is represented by 
( , , , )x y x y x y x y x yw b d u a∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧=  such that: 
1.  x y x yb b b∧ =  
2.  x y x y x yd d d d d∧ = + −  
3.  x y x y x y x yu b u u b u u∧ = + +  
4.  x y y x x y x x y yx y
x y x y x y
b u a u a b u a u a
a
b u u b u u∧
+ += + +  
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and 0x yu ∧ ≠ .  Therefore, x y x yw w w∧ ≡ ∧ .  Jøsang defined 
this as a conjunction. 
2. Disjunction Operator 
Given that x and y represent two distinct propositions 
denoted as ( , , , )x x x x xw b d u a=  and ( , , , )y y y y yw b d u a=  respectively, 
then the belief that either x or y is true is represented by 
( , , , )x y x y x y x y x yw b d u a∨ ∨ ∨ ∨ ∨=  such that: 
1.  x y x y x yb b b b b∨ = + −  
2.  x y x yd d d∨ =  
3.  x y x y x y x yu d u u d u u∨ = + +  
4.  x x y y x y y x x y x x y yx y
x y x y x y x y
u a u a b u a u a b u a u a
a
u u b u u b u u∨
+ − − −= + − − −  
and 0x yu ∨ ≠ .  Therefore, x y x yw w w∧ ≡ ∧ .  Jøsang defined 
this as a disjunction. 
3. Negation Operator 
A negative of an opinion indicates that an opinion is 
false.  This negation is similar to a "NOT" in standard 
logic.  If we let ( , , , )x x x x xw b d u a=  be an opinion about a 
proposition x, then xw  has the following properties: 
1.  x xb d¬ =  
2.  x xd b¬ =  
3.  x xu u¬ =  
4.  1x xa a¬ = −  
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4. Recommendation Operator 
Jøsang also defined a recommendation operator.  The 
recommendation operator allows one to form an opinion about 
something based on someone else's opinion about it.  For 
example, assume there are two agents, A and B.  B has an 
opinion about a proposition x.  Jøsang's model allows agent 
A to form an opinion about proposition x based on his 
knowledge of agent B.  Let A and B be two agents where 
( , , , )A A A A AB B B B Bw b d u a=  represents A's opinion about B's 
recommendations, and where ( , , , )B B B B Bx x x x xw b d u a=  is B's opinion 
about x shown as a recommendation to A.  Let 
( , , , )AB AB AB AB ABx x x x xw b d u a= , then ABxw  has the following properties: 
1.  AB A Bx B xb b b=  
2.  AB A Bx B xd b d=  
3.  AB A A A Bx B B B xu d u b u= + +  
4.  AB Bx xa a=  
AB
xw  is called the recommendation between ABw  and Bxw , 
expressing A's opinion about x as a result of the 
recommendation from B.  Jøsang uses the symbol ⊗  to define 
AB A B
x B xw w w≡ ⊗ . 
It can be proved that the recommendation operator is 
associative but not commutative.  This implies that the 
order in which opinions are combined is significant.  The 
recommendation operator assumes that with a chain including 
more than one opinion, each opinion is formed independently 
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of other recommendations.  This implies that the same entity 
should not appear more than once in any chain. 
We will use Jøsang's recommendation operator in Chapter 
IV to show how opinions of COTS component manufacturers can 
help us form opinions on their sub-contractors based on our 
trust in the component manufacturer. 
5. Consensus Operator 
Jøsang defines a consensus operator as one that 
combines opinions on the same proposition in a fair and 
equal way.  For example, suppose two different professors 
observed the work ethic of a particular student.  Each 
professor might have formed a different opinion about the 
student dependent on the behavior of the student at that 
particular time.  The Bayesian approach dictates that the 
consensus operator must then be the opinion that a single 
professor would have after observing the student during both 
periods.  Jøsang [21] showed the following definition 
corresponds to this approach and is based on Bayesian 
calculus. 
Let ( , , , )A A A A Ax x x x xw b d u a=  and ( , , , )B B B B Bx x x x xw b d u a=  be the opinions 
of Agents A and B respectively about the same proposition x.  
, , , , ,( , , , )A B A B A B A B A Bx x x x xw b d u a=  is the opinion such that: 
1.  , ( ) /A B A B B Ax x x x xb b u b u k= +  
2.  , ( ) /A B A B B Ax x x x xd d u d u k= +  
3.  , ( ) /A B A Bx x xu u u k=  
4.  , ( )
2
B A A B A B A B
A B x x x x x x x x
x A B A B
x x x x
a u a u a a u ua
u u u u
+ − += + −  
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Where A B A Bx x x xk u u u u= + −  and where 0A Bx xu u= ≠  and 1A Bx xu u= ≠ .  
Jøsang calls this the consensus operator between Axw  and Bxw  
and uses the symbol ⊕  to represent it and defined it as 
,A B A B
x x xw w w≡ ⊕ .  It indicates an imaginary agent [A, B]'s 
opinion about x, as if it represented both. 
It can be proved that the consensus operator is both 
commutative and associative.  This implies that the order in 
which the opinions are combined has no influence on the 
calculation.  As with the recommendation operator, 
independence of each opinion within the chain is assumed. 
We will use Jøsang's consensus operator in Chapter IV 
to combine multiple independent opinions of COTS component 
manufacturers into one opinion in an equal and fair manner. 
 31
IV.  ANALYSIS 
We argue Jøsang's model can be used to form an overall 
opinion about manufacturers of COTS components based upon 
multiple entities opinions using the subjective logic 
consensus operator. 
Additionally, one could use Jøsang's subject logic 
recommendation operator to form an opinion on a separate 
entity's opinion about something or someone.  For example, 
assume there exist two agents A and B where agent A has an 
opinion about B's trustworthiness and B has an opinion on 
proposition x.  Jøsang's recommendation model allows agent A 
to form an opinion on proposition x.  This could be useful 
for forming an opinion on a subcontractor x that works for 
agent B. 
In this chapter, we provide examples implementing both 
Jøsang's consensus and recommendation operators based on 
opinions provided by trusted third parties. 
A. EXAMPLE OF JØSANG'S CONSENSUS OPERATOR 
If multiple government agencies formed independent 
opinions of a fictitious integrated circuit manufacturer, 
the consensus operator will allow for the formation of one 
opinion, taking all into account equally and fairly.  This 
should reduce uncertainty. 
In this example, we will examine a fictitious 




using fabricated information provided by three intelligence 
communities that we will refer to as Intelligence Agencies 
A, B, and C. 
This scenario will operate on three important 
assumptions.  The first assumption is that each of the three 
intelligence agencies acquired the information that they 
used to form their opinion independently of the others. 
The second assumption is that each of the intelligence 
agencies has enough knowledge to make an informed opinion 
about Super Good ICs Inc.   
The last assumption is that each of the intelligence 
agencies can be trusted to provide an honest opinion of 
Super Good ICs Inc, e.g., they have not been infiltrated or 
influenced in some way by another entity. 
Recall that the consensus operator in subjective logic 
(represented by ⊕ ) allows for the combining of multiple 
opinions about the same proposition into one single opinion 
taking all into account equally and fairly. 
Let ( , , , )A A A A ASG SG SG SG SGw b d u a=  and ( , , , )B B B B BSG SG SG SG SGw b d u a=  be the 
opinions of agency A and B respectively about whether Super 
Good ICs Inc is not producing chips that have extra, 
unauthorized functionality.  For this example, let 
(.85,.01,.14,.50)ASGw =  and (.80,.05,.15,.50)BSGw =  represent belief, 
disbelief, uncertainty, and atomicity.  Atomicity is .5 
because there exist only two possibilities, Super Good ICs 
is providing altered chips or it is not. 
A B
SG SGw w⊕  is calculated using the equations shown 
Chapter III as follows: 
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1.  , ( ) / (.85*.15 .80*.14) / (.14 .15 .14*.15) .89A B A B B ASG SG SG SG SGb b u b u k= + = + + − =  
2.  , ( ) / (.01*.15 .15*.14) / (.14 .15 .14*.15) .08A B A B B ASG SG SG SG SGd d u d u k= + = + + − =  
3.  , ( ) / (.14*.15) / (.14 .15 .14*.15) .08A B A BSG SG SGu u u k= = + − =  
4.  
, ( ) .5*.14 .5*.15 (.5 .5)*.14*.15) .5
2 .14 .15 2*.14*.15
B A A B A B A B
A B SG SG SG SG SG SG SG SG
SG A B A B
SG SG SG SG
a u a u a a u ua
u u u u
+ − + + − += = =+ − + −  
Where A B A Bx x x xk u u u u= + −  and where 0A Bx xu u= ≠  and 1A Bx xu u= ≠ .  
, (.89,.08,.08,.5)A Bxw =  is the consensus of Axw  and Bxw  is 
represented by A Bx xw w⊕ . 
However, if agency C has evidence that Super Good ICs 
Inc is using substandard materials likely to cause the chips 
to fail in an unacceptable period of time and has formed the 
following opinion (.01,.95,.04,.50)CSGw =  then ,A B CSG SGw w⊕  becomes: 
1.  
( , ), , ,( ) / (.89*.04 .01*.08) / (.08 .04 .08*.04) .31A B C A B C C A BSG SG SG SG SGb b u b u k= + = + + − =  
2.  
( , ), , ,( ) / (.89*.04 .04*.08) / (.08 .04 .08*.04) .33A B C A B C C A BSG SG SG SG SGd d u d u k= + = + + − =  
3.  ( , ), ,( ) / (.08*.04) / (.08 .04 .08*.04) .03A B C A B CSG SG SGu u u k= = + − =  
4.  
, , , ,
( , ),
, ,
( ) .5*.08 .5*.04 (.5 .5).08*.04 .5
2 .08 .04 2*.08*.04
C A B A B C A B C A B C
A B C SG SG SG SG SG SG SG SG
SG A B C A B C
SG SG SG SG
a u a u a a u ua
u u u u
+ − + + − += = =+ − + −  
Where , ,A B C A B Cx x x xk u u u u= + −  and where , 0A B Cx xu u= ≠  and 
, 1A B Cx xu u= ≠ .  ( , ), (.31,.33,.03,.5)A B Cxw =  is the consensus of ,A Bxw  and 
C
xw  is represented by ,A B Cx xw w⊕ . 
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B. EXAMPLE OF JØSANG'S RECOMMENDATION OPERATOR 
The recommendation operator can be used to form an 
opinion based on someone else's recommendation.  For 
example, if Agency A had an opinion on COTS manufacturer B, 
and COTS manufacturer B had an opinion on subcontractor s, 
then we can calculate A's opinion on s using Jøsang's model. 
Let ( , , , )A A A A AB B B B Bw b d u a=  represents A's opinion about B's 
recommendations and let ( , , , )B B B B Bs s s s sw b d u a=  represent B's 
opinion about s. 
Given that (.90,.05,.05,.5)ABw =  and (.95,.02,.03,.5)Bsw = , A's 
opinion about s, represented by A A Bs B sw w w= ⊗  is calculated as 
follows: 
1.  .90*.95 .86AB A Bs B sb b b= = =  
2.  .90*.02 .02AB A Bs B sd b d= = =  
3.  .05 .05 .90*.03 .13AB A A A Bs B B B su d u b u= + + = + + =  
4.  .5AB Bs sa a= =  
A
sw  is Agency A's opinion on COTS manufacturer B's 
subcontractor s, formed based on B's opinion and A's "trust" 
in B's opinion.  Asw  is calculated to be (.86,.02,.13,.5)Asw =  and 
is represented by A A Bs B sw w w= ⊗ . 
C. USING THE RESULTS OF THE CALCULATED TRUST OPINION 
The calculated trust opinion represents the combination 
of others opinions about certain propositions.  How to act 
on the calculated opinion is subjective.  The final decision 
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on how to act on the calculated trust opinion will depend on 
many factors such as the persons or agencies aversion to 
risk, the value of the proposition being considered, and the 
consequences of making a bad decision. 
In an automated system, the decision to accept or 
reject a proposition could be based on pre-defined threshold 
values established by the organizations policy makers 
D. WEAKNESSES WITH JØSANG'S MODEL 
Implementing Jøsang's model will require opinions 
formed using consistent methods able to contend with a 
variety of situations on a limited number of propositions.  
Additionally, it will be difficult to verify that the 
opinions formed by each intelligence agency were formed from 
independent sources. 
1. Forming Good Opinions 
Analysts expressing the opinions of their respective 
organizations (such as from U.S. government agencies, non-
government organizations, various private sector companies, 
and select foreign partners) will be required to form 
opinions based upon their particular organizations knowledge 
of an outside organization with respect to a certain 
proposition.  One possible way of assigning belief values is 
as follows: 
• Very strong belief in the proposition (belief 
value from 1.00 to .90) 
• Strong belief in the proposition (belief value 
from .89 to .70) 
• Belief in the proposition (belief value from .69 
to .50) 
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• Dis-belief in the proposition (belief value from 
.49 to .40) 
• Strong dis-belief in the proposition (belief value 
from .39 to .10) 
• Very strong dis-belief in the proposition (belief 
value from .09 to .0) 
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V. CROSS DOMAIN INFORMATION SHARING 
Chapter IV illustrated a formal model for calculating 
measures of trust using opinions of parties interested in 
the COTS components.  However, where would one obtain such 
opinions and how would they be stored? In order to implement 
Jøsang's trust model to COTS component manufacturers, we 
would ideally generate opinions about a particular 
manufacturer from large repositories of information from all 
available sources, including U.S. government agencies, non-
government organizations (NGOs), various private sector 
companies, and select foreign partners. 
This system would need to: 
• Share information across many domains spanning 
organizational boundaries 
• Accept input from multiple security levels 
• Output information to multiple security levels 
while protecting the sources and methods used to 
obtain the information 
• Utilize mixed model access control (i.e., the 
Bell-Padula model on its own is insufficient) 
• Enforce domain-specific declassification polices 
and rules 
• Be trustworthy as defined in Chapter I 
Currently, there is no formal, efficient, and practical 
method used to share information spanning multiple domains 
(e.g., DoD, NGOs, industry, etc) and multiple 
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classifications.  Implementation of a cross domain 
information sharing model will allow cooperation among 
disparate organizations that might not otherwise know other 
organizations are working on the same problem. 
 
Figure 8.   Proposed Radiant Alloy Architecture for High 
Assurance Systems available from 
http://www.nps.edu/Research/mdsr/Docs/Vol28Mar08.pdf. 
 
A proposed system that meets some of the requirements 
is illustrated in Figure 8.  Radiant Alloy is expected to 
provide access using both MLS and Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC) models.  In the proposed model, MLS will be used to 
divide the various classification domains and RBAC will be 
used to provide fine grain access control. 
The combining of these two methods for access control 
might result in unexpected weaknesses in the model; Radiant 














































convincing the above organizations to share information with 
organizations that they have not individually vetted might 
prove difficult. 
Radiant Alloy will broker information in an enterprise, 
multilevel secure (MLS) system using mixed model access 
control.  This system would be tiered in such a way as to 
prohibit the transfer of classified information to 
organizations without the required clearances or need to 
know.  Figure 8 illustrates the concept of an Information 
Broker(IB), an information management controller in the 
information sharing system which acts as an intermediary 
between the requestor of the information and the data 
repositories [22].  The IB should provide the requested data 
without allowing the user the ability to know or infer the 
original source of the data (i.e., the "safety property" 
which guards against information leakage.  One method of 
doing this is to encapsulate the data under the IB's name, 
maintaining the confidentiality of the requestor and 
providing repository.  The IB requests data through the 
Trusted Database Connector (TDC) to fulfill user requests.  
The IB is intended to be a highly reliable component of the 
information sharing system, able to access various 
classifications. 
For example, if a U.S. intelligence agency has 
classified information that indicates a particular COTS 
component manufacturer has added a method of bypassing 
normal authentication methods to their products, it could 
indicate so in their opinion in the shared information 
database.  However, if the information was retrieved by an 
agency without the proper clearance or need to know, the 
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opinion can be "downgraded" by decreasing either the belief 
or disbelief component of Jøsang's quadruple while 
increasing the uncertainty component.  A similar method is 
used with respect to the Global Positioning System (GPS) 
called selective availability (SA).  SA introduces 
intentional, slowly changing random errors of up to a 
hundred meters in the publicly available navigation signals 
to prevent mal actors from using GPS based weapons.  An 
encoded GPS signal, the Precise Positioning Service (PPS), 
which does not contain the SA errors, is primarily used by 
the DoD [23]. 
Cover stories can be created to obfuscate the reasoning 
behind the opinion to un-cleared organizations such as 
justifying poor opinions based on poor reliability and/or 
manufacturing defects, poor treatment of factory workers, 
etc., when in fact it is due to purposeful modifications to 
components. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The reliance on COTS components by DoD may be exploited 
by well-funded adversaries either by discovering existing 
un-intentional defects or weaknesses in the components used 
(since they have access to the same components) or by 
introducing vulnerabilities at some point during the product 
lifecycle. 
Jøsang's model can be used to calculate trust in COTS 
manufacturers and their COTS components by providing a 
systematic and formal way to combine the opinions of 
multiple entities about the manufacturers and their 
components.  Additionally, it provides the unique ability of 
calculating the trust in a different entity's opinion based 
on how much "trust" is placed in the entity submitting the 
opinion. 
To utilize the proposed trust model, DoD will need to 
implement a cross domain information sharing scheme such as 
outlined in Chapter V.  Populating this system will require 
various U.S. government agencies, NGOs, various private 
sector companies, and select foreign partners to submit 
opinions in a consistent and standard way. 
We recommend that DoD only utilize accredited 
components manufactured by trusted factories tested within 
the components common and not so common applications in 
mission-critical and performance-intensive activities. 
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A. FUTURE WORK 
1. Automation 
The desired end state of this proposed information 
sharing and trust model is for the end user to be able to 
quickly and easily access trust information about component 
manufacturers suitable for his or her role.  This would be 
most easily accomplished through an automated system. 
a. Populating the Model 
This proposed method for calculating trust could 
be more widely applied if the information repository the 
model uses to calculate opinions is populated by some 
automated means.  Such automation could pull information 
about individual components from various statistics 
including: reliability statistics, failure rates, 
survivability data, expected component life, method of 
failure (catastrophic vs graceful degradation), etc.  An 
appropriate opinion can then be calculated using the amount 
of information available as a guide for the belief, 
disbelief, and uncertainty values. 
b. Generating Opinions from the Model 
With a populated repository of opinions, the 
automation of generating the appropriate opinions should be 
straight forward.  However, determining appropriate 
threshold values on whether to engage in a transaction might 
prove challenging since different users have different 
tolerances with respect to risk. 
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2. Improving upon Jøsang's Model 
Is Jøsang's too generalized to be successfully utilized 
in such a manner?  Jøsang's subjective logic trust model 
allows the calculation of trust with uncertainty and 
incomplete information. 
Jøsang's model could provide too much latitude when 
forming opinions.  He does not provide guidelines on how to 
formulate opinions or how to assign values to them. 
Defining discrete values for opinions will be necessary 
in order to resolve ambiguity with the implementation of his 
model.  Currently, many Department of the Navy (DoN) 
projects are tracked using the colors red, yellow, or green 
to indicate behind schedule, at risk for falling behind 
schedule, and on/ahead of schedule respectively.  It appears 
obvious that further granularity would be needed to 
implement this model, but how much more?  Are ten distinct 
divisions (e.g., scale of one to ten) enough to provide the 
desired precision?  Or are more divisions desirable? 
3. Implementing the Model 
How much would it cost to implement such an information 
sharing scheme?  Who would pay for such a system?  Would it 
be paid for by one organization, or would the costs be 
shared amongst all of its users?   
What policies and/or regulations need to be altered in 
order to share such information amongst these organizations?  
Does the proposed Radiant Alloy system meet the requirements 
set forth in Chapter V?  Do any other current or proposed 
systems meet our system requirements? 
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Once such a system is established, working groups with 
representation from all concerned organizations would need 
to be established to determine how their respective 
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